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THE PROMISE OF ABUNDANT LIFE:
PATENTING A MAGNIFICENT OBSESSION
George P. Smith, H*
Today, scientific work is less a basic expression of the "ancient
aristocratic ethos of the love of knowledge" than a mere job to be
done-by entrepreneurs, employees, or others who have independent
funding.' Genentech, a San Francisco based biotechnology company,
recently issued shares on the over-the-counter market. Among its
products are a hormone capable of stimulating human growth, mass
produced human insulin which would allow a substantial reduction in
cost of the treatment of diabetes, and interferon which may prove to
be the long awaited "miracle" drug to combat cancer. The price of
Genentech stock increased dramatically during the first day of trad-
ing, and some brokers even suggest that Genentech may well be the
next Polaroid or Xerox.2
It has been asserted that patenting new forms of life, as recently
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court,' will be guided by
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America; Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Kennedy
Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University 1977-81; Special Consulting Counsel, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.
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lagio Study in Italy. Acknowledgement is also made of the research assistance of Vincent Ge-
lardi, Class of 1981, Catholic University School of Law.
Compton, Science, Anti Science and Human Values, 1 Amicus 33 (1980).
' Inventors Dream of Genes, TIME, Oct. 20, 1980, at 72. The potential profits to be derived
from manipulating the genetic code-be it either to create new forms of life sufficient to clean
up toxic chemical wastes or to produce anti-cancer agents on a grand scale-spurred President
Derek Bok to suggest that Harvard University start its own genetic engineering firm. Strong
faculty opposition, however, forced him to give up these plans. A Firm, No., TIME, Dec. 1, 1980,
at 59.
Presently more than a dozen companies are heavily involved in bioengineering. See generally
Genetic Engineering Thrives in Boston Area, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1981, § D, at 15, col. 1.;
Greenhouse, Science May Patent New Forms of Life, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1980, § A, at 1, col.
6. Biotechnology stocks have not proved resistant to the economic recession. The long (5-10
years) lead time required for a new biotechnology product to be developed does not make bio-
technology stocks as attractive to investors at a time when high interest rates make conven-
tional investments rewarding. Behr, Weak Genes: BRL Sees Recovery, Wash. Post, Mar. 28,
1982, at G1, col. 4; Hilts, The Gold Rush of Companies Into Biotechnology is Waning, Wash.
Post, Nov. 3, 1981, at A10, col. 1.
• Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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short term profit motives rather than sound philosophical principles.4
However, scientific knowledge is not, in and of itself, an absolute end.
The thrust and purpose of patenting new life forms are basically
technological and are essentially political. Because the etiology of
new life forms is political, both its costs and its benefits are, of neces-
sity, of public interest and concern.5
Pure scientific inquiry does not produce an economic exploitation
of nature; only man's use of the truths of scientific inquiry does. The
methodological style of natural science seeks to demonstrate causal
relations among events. Thus, the laws of science state that whenever
X occurs or varies in a particular way, Y will similarly occur or vary
in a particular way. This phenomonom has been aptly termed "a
formula for action." Its practical application awaits only an individ-
ual's decision that it might be economically advantageous to try to
mobilize X's to produce Y's." Science promises truth, not peace of
mind.'
The purpose of this essay will be to explore the parameters of the
scientific imperative to explore truth. The scope of this inquiry is
shaped in part by the United States patent laws and administrative
interpretations and, more specifically, by the United States Supreme
Court in its recent holding allowing the new forms of life created in a
laboratory to be patented. The ultimate purpose of this piece, then,
is to refute the arrogance of power theory expressed as being implicit
in the investigations of the vast potential for the positive achieve-
ment of good through harnessing the "New Biology." Thus, I intend
to demonstrate that what has been dismissed as but a magnificent
obsession for power, profits and immortality has in truth a far more
intrinsic potential for good and reward for the scientific community
and the greater world community.
Improvement of man's genetic endowment by striving for positive
propagation of those with a superior genetic make-up or, conversely,
" Annas, Life Forms: The Law and The Profits, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21, 22 (Oct. 1978).
The first flush of enthusiasm for the profitability of biotechnology products resulted in a tre-
mendous initial infusion of money into both biotechnology companies and biology departments
of major universities. See Hilts, supra note 2, at A10, col. 1. See also, Hilts, Gene Research
Institute, MIT Arrangement Set, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1981, at A7, col. 5; Behr, Du Pont Gives
Harvard $6 Million, Wash. Post, June 30, 1981, at D7, col. 1.
' Compton, supra note 1, at 37.
Id.
7 See Hilts, 'Rules' Drawn For Marketing Gene Research, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1982, at Al,
col. 3; Cohn, Stanford Moves to Speed Use of Gene Splicing, Cloning Methods, Wash. Post,




delimination of those with negative genetic inheritance has always
been a primary concern in the field of genetics.' If the quality of life
can in some way be improved or advanced by use of law as it relates
to genetics, then such must be undertaken. No longer does the Dos-
toevskian quest to give life meaning through suffering become an in-
escapable given. By and through new scientific advances in the field
of genetics, the real potential exists to prevent, in large measure,
much human suffering before it manifests itself in or through life.
I. ALTERING HUMAN EVOLUTION
Today, man is in a position not only to alter the social and envi-
ronmental conditions of the universe, but also to change his very es-
sence. 9 The mythology of the Minotaur and the Centaur, half man
and half animal, may well become the reality of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Indeed, modern medicine is presently not only attempting to
create man-animal combinations, but also man-machine combina-
tions (Cyborgs). 1° Plastic arteries, artificial hearts, electrically con-
trolled artificial limbs, and pacemakers highlight the achievements of
modern science to replace diseased or worn out parts of the human
body.
Efforts to construct or engineer biologically functional bacterial
plasmids in vitro exemplify the relatively new technology of recombi-
nant DNA.11 Regarded as the most significant step in the field of ge-
netics since 1953, research in this technology will facilitate identifica-
tion of every one of the 100,000 genes in the human cell. Armed with
this information, efforts could be directed toward replacing defective
genes with healthy ones. Thus, the hope is that by making such
replacements, genetic diseases such as hemophilia and sickle-cell ane-
mia could be conquered.1" Indeed, the plenitude of new products of
nature that could substantially improve the human condition is stag-
" See generally G. SMrrH, GEizirrics, ETHICS AND THE LAW 1 (1981).
" J. FLrrcHEi, THe ETHics OF GaNTc CONTROL 5 (1974).
"o Rivers, Genetic Engineering Portends a Grave New World, SAT. Rzv., Apr. 8, 1972, at 23.
See generally V. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD (1977); Address by Prof. Lawrence H. Tribe,
"Clones, Cyborgs & Chimeras," Rose F. Kennedy Lecture, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 5, 1978).
11 DNA is the basic genetic material that transmits inherited characteristics.
'2 Clark, Begley & Hager, The Miracle of Spliced Genes, NEwsw=K, Mar. 17, 1980, at 62.
See generally Baker & Clough, The Technological Use and Methodology of Recombinant
DNA, 51 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 1009 (1978); Berger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of Knowl-
edge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 Sup. CT. L. Rav. 83 (1978); Swazey, Sorenson &
Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA
Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1077 (1978); Hilts, Putting Genes to Work for Sci-
ence, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
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gering to the imagination.
The National Institute of Health has taken a conservative view of
the limits of safety review required by those institutions receiving
federal grant monies to experiment in DNA. Recently, however, two
hundred representatives from the scientific community called upon
NIH to loosen the restriction on gene-splitting experiments con-
ducted in the United States. The scientists expressed the growing
agreement that DNA research carries with it fewer risks than had
once been thought.18
The central question which arises in relation to the current scien-
tific advances is whether genetic engineering should be promoted and
encouraged as a basic recognition of the freedom of scientific inquiry
and right of privacy. Significant potential dangers are present in con-
junction with the almost limitless opportunity for scientific advance-
ment within the technology of recombinant DNA, commonly referred
to as genetic engineering. The fear that the proverbial "mad scien-
tist," working independently or with an enemy foreign power, could
isolate and then proceed to duplicate a cancer organism and place it,
possibly, in public water supplies is not easily dismissed. Acts of
thoughtless negligence in a laboratory could result in the "escape" of
a deadly microbe which in turn could give rise to a "parade of hor-
ribles." Chance occurences are always inherent in any scientific inter-
vention.14 When the chance of harmful accident is calculated, the pri-
mary consideration is whether the merit of the intervention justifies
beginning or continuing the experiment. 8
Genetic engineering, viewed as an instrument to revolutionize, lim-
its the effect of natural selection and replaces it with programmed
decision-making. Programmed decision-making, in turn, serves to fa-
cilitate rational thinking rather than impede it. Is it shameful to ac-
knowledge that man has the capability to be in control of himself?
The lack of control over the years has spawned a type of "evolution-
's Scientists Want Limit Dropped on Gene-Splitting Experiments, Wash. Post, Nov. 26,
1980, at C3, col. 5. See also Hilts, Gene Splicers' Fear Recedes, Awe Remains, Wash. Post,
Nov. 4, 1981, at Al, col. 1. But see Fields, Bizarre Circumstances Surround Chance Cloning of
Banned Virus, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (in violation of
federal guidelines that bar genetic copying, a researcher at the University of California at San
Diego cloned a virus). See generally Bomer, Shall We Clone Man, in FABRICATED MAN 59 (P.
Ramsey ed. 1970); Holtzman, Patenting Certain Forms of Life: A Moral Justification, 9 HAs-
TINGS CENTER RmP. 9 (June 1979).
14 Neville, Philosophic Perspectives on Freedom of Inquiry, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115, 1121
(1978).
15 Cohen, Restrictions of Research With Recombinant DNA: The Dangers of Inquiry and
The Burden of Proof, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1081, 1082, 1099 (1978).
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ary wisdom" which, in turn, resulted in the bubonic plague, smallpox,
yellow fever, typhoid, diabetes and cancer. The quest for maximum
efficient utilization of biological and medical knowledge represents
one of the tenets of the so-called "evolutionary wisdom."
'
A number of Post-Darwinians in the scientific community assert
that there is no wisdom in evolution, only chance occurrence. Few, if
any, would be willing to accept unconditionally all that nature be-
stows, particularly disease. Consequently, science finds itself in the
position of trying to both influence and, in many cases, control the
process of evolution. Some would go so far as to suggest that danger-
ous knowledge is never half as dangerous as dangerous ignorance.
17
The sanctity of creation and the fundamental right of privacy in
procreation (which is a basic freedom) may be altered by compelling
state interests."8 Is there a more compelling state interest than the
desire to stop a "chromosomal lottery" which saddles the economy
each year with four million Americans born with diabetes or fifty
thousand born with discernible genetic diseases?19 State interests in
minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social good should
be properly validated.20
Opponents of unrestricted genetic research specifically attack its
proponents as being both scientifically and socially irresponsible and
the ultimate promoters of a serious environmental disaster.21 Oppo-
nents suggest that nature has developed strong barriers against ge-
netic interchanges between species and that extreme caution ought to
be used during experimentation in this area.' Others argue that
mankind's genetic inheritance is its greatest and most indispensable
treasure which must be protected and guaranteed at any cost. These
opponents submit that the evolutionary wisdom of the ages must not
" Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. RE v. 1131, 1139 (1978).
Fletcher observes that there is nothing fundamentally unnatural or intrinsically wrong, or haz-
ardous for the species, in the ambition that drives man to develop the technology to understand
himself. It would in fact seem more offensive to fail to use and develop man's natural curiosity
and talent for asking questions or worse to try to suppress it. "This is the greater danger of our
species, to try to pretend that we are another kind of animal... and that the human mind can
rise above its ignorance by simply asserting that there are things it has no need to know."
Thomas, Notes of a Biology Watcher: The Hazards of Science, 296 NEw ENG. J. MED. 3, 211,
228 (1977).
17 See Toulmin, Science and Ethics: Can They be Reconnected?, 73 U. CHI. MAG. 2 (1981).
18 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19 See J. ROSLANSKY, GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 46 (1966).
20 See G. SMITH, supra note 8, at 2.
2 See generally R. HowARD & J. RIFKIN, WHO SHOULD PLAY GOD? (1977); Hilts, Genetic
Scientist is Punished for Test Violations, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
" Sinsheimer, Recombinant DNA-On Our Own, 26 Bio-SCIENCE 599 (1976).
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be irreversibly threatened or abridged in order to satisfy the ambi-
tion and professional curiosity of some members of the scientific
community.
Autonomy, self-determination, and a basic sense of freedom must
be tempered by logic, objectivity, and a disinterested search for
knowledge, a search that may result in the minimizing of human suf-
fering and maximizing of social good. 8 But what is the social good in
question? It is suggested that the social good, in this context, could
be equated with an economic policy that lessens the financial burden
on citizens and supports and maintains genetically defective citizens.
The wisest policy is, by consensus, that which promotes a
good-social, economic or otherwise-for the greatest number. Thus,
human need and well-being shape the degree of positive good result-
ing from one policy as opposed to another.24 Alternatively, a determi-
nation could be made in order to structure what is right or wrong,
good or evil, according to whether the consequences of an act or pub-
lic policy add to or detract from the aggregate human well being.'
Ultimately, the decision for or against a policy is going to be tied to
development and maintenance of an a priori standard or ethic
(where, in theory, a balancing occurred before the standard was set)
or to a situation ethic by which the consequences, pro and con, equi-
ties or inequities, of each proposed action will be carefully weighed
and a conclusion with an ethical posture or structure of a standard of
modus operandi6 will be reached.
II. ENCOURAGING EXPERIMENTATION
Recognizing that a sustained level of progress for society would de-
pend upon a continuing standard of technological evolution as well as
individual technological contributions of exceptional merit and bene-
fit, the Founding Fathers endeavored to codify this attitude within
the Constitution itself. By structuring a system of checks and bal-
ances within the Constitution which would promote both perspec-
tives, contributions which were truly exceptional could be promoted
by grant of a limited monopolization as authorized by the Patent
Clause.'7 However, the grant of limited monopolization was intended
2' Sinsheimer, Potential Risks, in RESEARCH WITH RECOMBINANT DNA (Nat'l Academy of Sci-
ence ed. 1977).
" V. GOODFIELD, supra note 10, at 71.
" Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1138-39.
2" Id. at 1138.
See generally T. BEAUCHAMP & L. WALTRS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS (1978);
Smith, Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and The New Biology, 41 PHAROS
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to be consistent with the guarantees of the fifth and the fourteenth
amendments, which recognize the right of all citizens to develop their
individual skills in pursuit of a trade or calling, and thus establish
this right as an inalienable property right."
The recorded history of efforts to legitimize monopolies for patents
of unworthy inventions is long. To its credit, the United States Su-
preme Court has thwarted these efforts and has thus recognized and
enforced the Constitutional mandate to allow the unfettered growth
and natural evolution of technology."9
On June 16, 1980, by a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court
decided that new forms of laboratory life were eligible for patents."
This decision may be regarded as a ratification of some of the accom-
plishments of the "biological revolution" which has allowed a broader
understanding of life and promoted a greater ability to manipulate
various forms. However, both the majority opinion and the dissent
stressed that they addressed only the question of whether the current
patent laws evinced a congressional intent to deny patents to those
inventions determined to be alive.31 More particularly, the court
chose to tie itself to the United States code section which provides:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title."'1 Out of this statute emerged
the issue of whether a manufactured microorganism constitued a
MED. J. 10 (1978).
, See Irons & Sears, Patent 'Re-examination': A Case for Administrative Arrogation, 1980
UTAH L. REv. 287-88.
By the Patent Clause, Congress is authorized "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discover-
ies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
, See Sakraida v. AgPro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 279 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 5-6 (1966); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882).
Interestingly, about 65-70% of litigated patents are invalidated. T. BFAUCHAMP & L. WAL-
TERs, supra note 27, at 305.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
s, Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, surveyed the Patent Act of 1793, as re-enacted in
1952, the Plant Patent Act of 1930, and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 and con-
cluded that there existed a strong congressional limitation against patenting bacteria. "It is the
role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws. This is
especially true where, as here, the composition sought to be patented uniquely implicates mat-
ters of public concern." Id. at 322. For those who have followed Justice Brennan's judicial phi-
losophy, this position, which calls for judicial restraint, is most interesting and unusual. In the
past, he has been the judicial activist and Chief Justice Burger the apostle of judicial restraint.
In Chakrabarty, the roles were reversed.
82 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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"manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of the
statute.33
Dr. Ananda M. Chakrabarty, a micro-biologist employed by the
General Electric Corporation, engaged in research in which he suc-
ceeded in manufacturing a new microorganism, not found in nature,
which is effective in breaking up oil spills. This genetically engi-
neered strain of pseudomonas is made by combining (or cross breed-
ing) four strains of oil eating bacteria into one man-made scavenging
microorganism which combines the beneficial properties of each of its
four parent bacteria. Each of the four strains digests particular hy-
drocarbons in crude oil, and the new microorganism is able to digest
these hydrocarbons in a mixture of oil and water-such as is found in
petroleum spills. Useful by-products of water, carbon dioxide and a
bacterial protein which is nutritious to inhabitants of the ocean, re-
main. Dr. Chakrabarty demonstrated that this manufactured "super-
strain" is much more efficient in digesting oil than a mixture of the
four individual bacteria. Another advantage is that this microorga-
nism, if it "escaped," would not be able to thrive in gas tanks or in
the oil fields of the earth and wreak uncontrolled environmental
havoc on the ecosphere." The Chakrabarty bacterium had already
been granted a patent in Britain, which had followed several Euro-
pean nations in recognizing both plants and animals as patentable."3
The patent application of Chakrabarty and General Electric was
for a manufactured microorganism product not found in nature as
well as a process of using the microorganism, on a carrier, to digest
oil spilled in water. The United States Patent Office rejected the
product claim, but allowed a portion of the process claim. The ratio-
nale for rejection of the product claim was that a living organism-a
naturally occurring product of nature-as this was determined to be,
was not within the classes of subject matter which are patentable.
The patent office reached this conclusion because there was no men-
tion of such a class in the controlling statute or in that statute's legis-
lative history. This decision was upheld by the Patent Office Board of
Appeals, but the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed, and the Patent and Trademark Office appealed to the
33 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307.
Gore, The Awesome Worlds Within a Cell, 150 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 355, 374-75 (1976).
08 Irons & Sears, Patents in Relation to Microbiology, 29 ANN. REV. MICROBIOLOGY 319, 331
(1975). See generally Kiley, Common Sense and the Uncommon Bacterium-Is 'Life' Patenta-
ble?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 468 (1978); Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1978); Wegner, The Patentability of 'New Manu-
facturers'-The Living Invention, in PATENT LAW CONFERENCE CORSaEBOOK (BNA ed.) (1978).
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United States Supreme Court.8
In the past, the Patent Office has included living things within the
statutory subject matter. For example, in 1873 United States Patent
No. 141,072 was issued to Louis Pasteur. Claim two of the patent
application reads: "Yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an
article of manufacture. 3 7 There are other examples, in other patents,
of claims having been granted for viruses and cultures."
Today, there are more than one hundred patent applications re-
lated to products of genetic engineering89 Chakrabarty sets the pace
for a wide variety of new "man-made" organisms which can facilitate
socially desirable processes such as growing wheat in arid lands,
leeching ores to assist mining companies in reaching remote parts of
the earth, and producing a "bug" that will ferment corn starch or
corn syrup into ethanol, an alcohol used in both whiskey and gasohol.
There is also a patent application for a bacterium that metabolizes
ethylene into ethylene glycol (antifreeze).40
Application of Chakrabarty, 517 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.) dismissed 439 U.S. 801 (1978), rev'd
sub noma. Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted 444 U.S. 924 (1979). To
be completely accurate, it should be mentioned that the case history of Chakrabarty is inextri-
cably bound with that of the case of In re Bergy, which was subsequently dismissed by the U.S.
Supreme Court as being moot. Bergy concerned a patent application by Malcolm Bergy and his
assignee, the Upjohn Company, for a biological pure culture of the micro-organism, Strepto-
myces vellosus, and to its specific employment in a process to produce the antibiotic, linco-
mycin, which cannot be producted with impure cultures. Here the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals held that a biologically pure culture of a naturally occurring micro-organism is
within the subject matter of patentability. In re Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A.
1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). Subsequently the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded Bergy to the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), holding
that a process for the use of a mathematical algorithm, when related to a computer system
which regulates a chemical reaction, is unpatentable. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1977). The
Customs Court vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty and consolidated it with Bergy for recon-
sideration. Thereupon, the Court perceived no over-riding relevance of Flook to Bergy and held
again that the Bergy patent claim was valid and the Chakrabarty patent claim was not. Appli-
cation of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). As previously noted, the United States Supreme
Court subsequently dismissed Bergy on a technicality as moot, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), and de-
cided Chakrabarty on the appeal. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
37 Student Papers, Microbiological Plant Patents, 10 IDEA 87 (1966).
Id. See Cooper, Patent Protection for New Forms of Life, 38 FED. BAR J. 34 (1979); Kip,
The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20 Gao WAsH. L. REv. 371 (1952).
39 O'Toole, In the Lab: Bugs to Grow Wheat, Wash. Post, June 18, 1980, at Al, col. 4. Wide-
spread discussion is being conducted within the scientific community concerning the creation of
organisms to make amino acids, a building block of proteins and, as such, a basic food source;
to assist in the cleanup of toxic wastes; and to duplicate photosynthesis, the energy converting
process in green plants. DeMott & Thomas, Test-Tube Life: Reg. U.S. Pat. Off., TiM, June 30,
1980, at 52.
40 As noted, the scientific production of a copy of the natural disease fighting, cancer fighting
compound called interferon has charted the dramatic medical frontier in genetic engineering.
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As noted, the major thrust of the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Chakrabarty is tied to the interpretation of the term
"manufacture" as it appears in the federal patent code. Observing
that Thomas Jefferson's Patent Act of 1793 (Act) stressed its cover-
age to "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof]," Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, defined manufacture as "the
production of articles for use from raw materials prepared by giving
to these new materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combina-
tions whether by hand labor or by machinery. 41 Citing approving
precedent defining "composition of matter" as including "all compo-
sitions of two or more substances ... all composite articles, whether
they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or
whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids," 4' the Chief Justice
concluded that the Chakrabarty microorganism qualifies as being
within patentable subject matter. The claim is particularly forceful
since it is for a product of human ingenuity which is non-natural in
its occurrence.'3
In response to the argument that microorganisms cannot be pat-
entable without express congressional authorization, the Chief Jus-
tice declared that Congress had already defined what was patentable
subject matter in section 101 of the Act, and that it was for the
courts to define that provision. Finding no ambiguity in the statutory
provisions and stressing the broad constitutional and statutory goal
of promoting "the Progress of Science and the useful Arts," Chief
Justice Burger adhered to his position that the definition the Court
gives to section 101 is consistent with the goals of the Act."
The Court declined to acknowledge the "grave risks" or the "grue-
some parade of horribles" which the Patent Office argued that the
Court should weigh in deciding whether the Chakrabarty invention is
patentable."5 Although acknowledging that "genetic research and re-
lated technological developments may spread pollution and disease,
that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice
may tend to depreciate the value of life," the Court concluded that
Barbash, Laboratory Life Forms Patentable, Wash. Post, June 17, 1980, § A, at 7, col. 6. See
generally Nelkin, Threats and Promises: Negotiating the Control of Research, 107 DAEDALUS
191 (1978).
4" 447 U.S. at 308 (1980).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 310. See generally Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Con-
stitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. Rav. 349 (1978).
" 447 U.S. at 315.
"' Id. at 316-17.
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neither the grant nor the denial of patents on microorganisms will
end advances in genetic research nor "deter the scientific mind from
probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the
tides."4 Indeed, the Court unequivocally stated that scientific argu-
ments against advancements in this field are matters of "high policy"
which should be considered by the legislative process which balances
and places in proper perspective the various competing values and
interests of all interested parties. 7 The Chief Justice concluded by
noting that if the Court has misconstrued the provisions of section
101, all that Congress needed to do was to amend the statute so as to
exclude from the protection of the patent laws organisms which are
produced by genetic engineering.'
Despite the Court's disclaimer that its action was purely construc-
tive in nature, merely an interpretation of a statutory mandate, it did
attempt to validate a new national policy. While invoking the Jeffer-
sonian concept of ingenuity in patent creativeness, it came down
four-square on a policy encouraging experimentation into the "New
Biology" despite the possible risk to mankind. Thus, while disclaim-
ing the application of a balancing test, it in effect performed one. It
correctly decided that the utility of the good which will flow from
research and experimentation into the varied fields of the "New Biol-
ogy" far outweighs the potential harm accruing as a consequence of
such undertakings. This is an eminently fair and reasonable position.
III. TOWARD A STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS
The Supreme Court's actions in Chakrabarty give private corpora-
tions the incentive to invest in further research into the fields of bio-
chemistry, genetics, and eugenics. This incentive and the anticipated
result therefrom satisfy the constitutional objective of early disclo-
sure which, in turn, expands the public domain of knowledge in these
fields. There can be little doubt that patentability of microorganisms
is "Progress of the Useful Arts."
Man's dehumanization and depersonalization will not be fostered
as a consequence of the continued quest for mastery of the genetic
code. Attendant to the freedom to undertake research into the excit-
ing and fertile frontiers of the "New Biology" is a coexistent respon-
sibility to pursue the work in a reasonable (i.e., rational) manner.
Pursuing the "New Biology" in a reasonable manner requires ade-
46 Id.
'7 Id. at 317.
,8 Id. at 318.
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quate attention to the safety factor in all aspects of the experimenta-
tion.4' The undesirable elements of a Brave New World can be tem-
pered only when knowledge is pursued with the purpose of
establishing the truth and integrity of the question, issue or process."
The vast potentials for advancing society and ridding it of a verisi-
militude of its present ills is an obvious good which must be pursued
steadily. Little sustaining harm can result from a reasonable pursuit
of truth and knowledge; for, indeed, truth and knowledge are the ba-
sic interstices in any balancing test. 1 If actions are undertaken and
performed with the goal of minimizing human suffering and maximiz-
ing the social good, then the noble integrity of evolution and genetic
progress will be preserved.
" Sinsheimer, The Dawn of Genetic Engineering, 190 SCIENCE 768 (1975).
See generally Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64
Gzo. L. REv. 697 (1976). See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssmENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED
GENErIcs (1981); Note, Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineering and the Patent Law
After Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 159 (1981).
" Lederberg, Orthobiosis: The Perfection of Man in PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS
29 (A. Tiselius & S. Nilsson eds. 1980).
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